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THE INTENT OF THE FR AMER:
JOHN BINGHAM’S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Michael Zuckert*
It is not often that a single individual is responsible for constitutional provisions
as important as Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. My project in this
Essay is not to engage in a study of original intent, or original public meaning, or
however we wish now to characterize the originalist project, but to engage in a quest for
John Bingham’s Amendment, for understanding the Amendment as he understood it.
Whether this gives us an authoritative reading of the Amendment for the purposes of
constitutional interpretation and adjudication is a separate issue. I treat Bingham as
an author and the text of Sections 1 and 5 as one would treat a text in political
philosophy or constitutional theory by any author.

It is not often that a single individual is responsible for
constitutional provisions as important as Sections 1 and 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. By “responsible” I mean that John Bingham,
Republican congressman from Ohio, was the author of the text of
these Sections (with the exception of the opening definition of
citizenship). He was not, of course, solely responsible for the
Amendment as it became part of the Constitution, in that he shared
responsibility with at least the two houses of Congress and the state
ratifiers. But his unique role in supplying the text of the Amendment
leads me to my project in this Essay: not to engage in a study of original
intent, or original public meaning, or however we wish now to
characterize the originalist project, but to engage in a quest for
Bingham’s Amendment, for understanding the Amendment as he
understood it. Whether this gives us an authoritative reading of the
Amendment for the purposes of constitutional interpretation and
adjudication is a separate issue, one that I will, at most, only touch on
here. I wish to treat Bingham as an author and the text of Sections 1
and 5 as one would treat a text in political philosophy or constitutional
theory by any author. Obviously, the Amendment understood as he
© 2022 Michael Zuckert. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Nancy R. Dreux Professor Emeritus, Political Science, University of Notre Dame.
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understood it should have some bearing on the official or legal
meaning of the Amendment, but, as I said, that is a somewhat separate
question.
In treating Bingham as an author or even as a poet, whose poem
was the text of Sections 1 and 5, I do not mean to treat him as a
complete solitaire. He developed his text in colloquy with colleagues
in the House and on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, but I am
thinking of these other participants as equivalent to, say, Ezra Pound
in “The Waste Land” of T.S. Eliot, sounding boards and perhaps
advisors on the rhyme scheme.
I have a partly personal reason for my project in this Essay. Many
years ago, I submitted to a law review an article on the Amendment,
which drew substantially on Bingham. Alas, the article was rejected
with the student editor’s comment that everyone knows Bingham was
an incoherent thinker and a bloviating speaker and thus almost
completely unreliable as a constitutionalist. That view no longer holds
in the literature. Most recent studies of the Amendment’s origins rely
heavily on Bingham and treat him with respect. But they consider him
as part of their quest for the original public meaning of the
Amendment and therefore do not centrally aim to bring out his
understanding of his handiwork. My focus is thus different from most
of the recent and past literature and my argument is different as well.
I differ in my emphases, most notably, in attending to Bingham’s early
antebellum constitutional thinking. Among other things, this focus
leads me to diminish the role of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
Bingham’s thinking. While other recent scholars give pride of place
to that Clause, I emphasize far more his concern with what became the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
My different emphases are related to one of my chief concerns—
to explain a puzzling claim made by Bingham during the debates on
the Amendment. Very early in the Thirty-Ninth Congress Bingham
forecast for the House of Representatives an amendment then under
consideration by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, of which he
was a member. That committee, he told the House,
has under consideration [a] general amendment to the
Constitution which looks to the grant of express power to the
Congress of the United States to enforce in behalf of every citizen
of every State and of every Territory in the Union the rights which
were guarantied to him from the beginning, but which guarantee
has unhappily been disregarded by more than one State of this
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Union, defiantly disregarded, simply because of a want of power in
Congress to enforce that guarantee. 1

Bingham refers here to an early version of what became the
Fourteenth Amendment, which differed from the adopted version in
one particularly striking way: it directly provided Congress with the
power to protect rights rather than forbade States from abridging
rights or arbitrarily depriving citizens of the objects of their rights.2
Somewhat later in the debates, speaking of a draft amendment
still cast as an empowerment of Congress but substantively even closer
to the amendment as ultimately adopted, Bingham made the same
point in somewhat different language:
I ask the attention of the House to the . . . consideration that the
proposed amendment does not impose upon any State of the
Union, or any citizen of any State of the Union, any obligation
which is not now enjoined upon them by the very letter of the
Constitution.3

Finally, in the debate on Sections 1 and 5 in the form taken by the
adopted amendment (sans the opening definition of citizenship) he
again stated:
There was a want hitherto, and there remains a want now, in the
Constitution of our country, which the proposed amendment will
supply. What is that? It is the power in the people, the whole
people of the United States, by express authority of the
Constitution to do that by congressional enactment which hitherto
they have not had the power to do . . . that is, to protect by national
law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic
and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction
whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the
unconstitutional acts of any State.4

The amendment enacts provisions to prevent the States from
abridging rights, but the rights themselves have been present in the
Constitution before the amendment:
[T]his Amendment takes from no State any right that ever
pertained to it. No State ever had the right, under the forms of law
or otherwise, to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the
laws or to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the
1 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 422–35 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in 2 THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS 55, 57
(Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021) [hereinafter LASH, Vol. 2].
2 LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 7.
3 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033–35 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 99, 100.
4 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2530–45 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 170, 178.
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Republic, although many of them have assumed and exercised the
power, and that without remedy.5

Let us call this the theory of preexisting (personal) rights and
(state) obligations. This is puzzling because the Amendment does
indeed seem to add previously nonexistent rights protections and state
obligations to the Constitution. I argue below that the key to
understanding this theory of preexisting rights and obligations, and
thus to Bingham’s theory of the Amendment, lies in his pre-Civil War
constitutional pronouncements.
I thus spend much of my space on the antebellum Bingham and
by most standards scant the actual debates on the Amendment in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress. But I try to show briefly at the end how the
materials gleaned from his earlier pronouncements supply a key to
Sections 1 and 5 of the Amendment as he understood them.
I.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Bingham was no constitutional virgin when he came to draft the
Fourteenth Amendment. He had entered Congress in 1855 and was
immediately swept up in constitutional and even philosophical debates
raised by the controversies over slavery in the territories. Recent
studies of the Fourteenth Amendment begin with surveys of “The Early
Origins of Privileges or Immunities,”6 or “On Antebellum Privileges
and Immunities.”7 This being a study of Bingham’s constitutional
thought, I begin with Bingham himself. There is actually very little to
no evidence that he knew of, or paid attention to, the prehistory of
privileges and immunities that recent scholars so much concern
themselves with.8 Bingham’s earliest expressions that appear relevant
to the Fourteenth Amendment occur rather in the context of
congressional debates over slavery in the territories. At issue was not
legislation in the ordinary sense but matters revolving on the
admittance of Kansas and Oregon to the Union, a distinction
important for grasping Bingham’s constitutional arguments. In the
case of Kansas, Bingham sided with his fellow Republicans and
opposed the Lecompton Constitution;9 in the case of Oregon, the

5
6

Id.
RANDY E. BARNETT & EVAN D. BERNICK, THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: ITS LETTER AND SPIRIT 41–60 (2021).
7 KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 9–66 (2014).
8 Though consider id. at 72, 277.
9 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 399 (1858) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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Republican Party split and his side lost in opposing the admittance of
Oregon.10
Although Bingham happily engaged in nitty-gritty constitutional
exposition, he regularly rooted it in normative political philosophy.
He understood the basics of political philosophy very similarly to the
way in which the American Founders and his fellow Republicans did:
in terms of the natural rights and social compact theory of government
as developed preeminently by John Locke. As Bingham said in 1857,
[t]he Constitution is based upon the EQUALITY of the human
race . . . . A State formed under the Constitution, and pursuant to
its spirit, must rest upon this great principle of EQUALITY. Its
primal object must be to protect each human being within its
jurisdiction in the free and full enjoyment of his natural rights. . . .
[T]he rights of human nature belong to each member of the State,
and cannot be forfeited but by crime.11

In his speech on Oregon, he repeated that thought almost
verbatim and added to it the affirmation of “natural rights [as] those
rights common to all men . . . to protect which, not to confer, all good
governments are instituted.”12 Clearly he is referring to the same
philosophy of government that found expression in the Declaration of
Independence: men are created equal in the sense that no human
being has a natural or divine right to rule another, but insecurity of
rights without rule is so severe that the equal individuals recognize that
a body with coercive power, government, is necessary to cure the rights
insecurity of life without government.13
The task of government follows for Bingham from this account of
its origins: “to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, and to
secure to each and every person . . . the absolute enjoyment of the
rights of human nature, which are as imperishable as the human soul,
and as universal as the human race.”14 From the original equality of
all and the task of securing rights follows the standard that Bingham
constantly evokes: “the equal protection of each.”15 The context
makes clear that he means by this the equal protection of the natural
rights of each by law. This more expansive version of his central

10 Statehood Survives Congressional Morass, OREGON.GOV, https://sos.oregon.gov
/archives/exhibits/constitution/Pages/after-state.aspx [https://perma.cc/VU4D-55S5].
11 LASH, supra note 7, at 83 n.66 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 139–40
(1857) (statement of Rep. Bingham)).
12 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–85 (1859) as reprinted in 1 THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS 152, 156 (Kurt T. Lash ed.,
2021) [hereinafter LASH, Vol. 1].
13 See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, LAUNCHING LIBERALISM 216–26 (2002).
14 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 136 (1857) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
15 Id. at 140.
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thought was on display at the very opening of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, the Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment.
That Congress opened on December 4, 1865, and on December 6
Bingham “introduced a joint resolution to amend the Constitution of
the United States so as to empower Congress to pass all necessary and
proper laws to secure to all persons in every State of the Union equal
protection in their rights [of] life, liberty, and property.”16
On the day before that Thaddeus Stevens had proposed a
different constitutional amendment: “All national and State laws shall
be equally applicable to every citizen, and no discrimination shall be
made on account of race [or] color.”17 Stevens’s draft amendment has
clearly a nondiscrimination thrust that makes it particularly well
targeted to the black codes that had recently popped up all through
the South and had definitely discriminated on the basis of race and
color. Bingham’s amendment differs substantially. It is not a formal
requirement of universally equal laws for whites and blacks alike but
has a substantive focus on protection of the particular set of natural
rights. Equality is the standard, but only for the protection of those
specified rights. In this sense it is more limited than Stevens’s
proposal. Bingham’s draft could apparently permit discrimination,
even on the basis of race, with respect to other matters. His draft calls
for equal protection of the specified rights, and it does not single out
race and color as specifically impermissible bases for unequal
treatment. In this respect it is broader than Stevens’s proposal. A final
difference concerns the protected class in each draft. Stevens’s
concern is with citizens; Bingham’s is with all persons. That difference
results from Bingham’s focus on protection of natural rights, which, as
we have seen, he believed inhered in every human being and was the
basis for government. We might notice also that neither draft
mentions privileges or immunities. In line with his theoretical
pronouncements, Bingham is preeminently concerned with natural
rights.18
Bingham appeared to believe that it was the glory of America that
its constitutions embodied these cardinal truths of political
philosophy. American federalism complicated matters substantially
because the different levels of government potentially stood in
different relationships to the natural rights and their securing. To sort
16 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra
note 1, at 22, 22.
17 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1865), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra
note 1, at 22, 22.
18 The difference between Bingham’s and Stevens’s proposals goes a long way toward
discrediting the interpretation of the Amendment in ILAN WURMAN, THE SECOND
FOUNDING: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2020).
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this out properly was indeed one of the primary tasks of his
amendment.
II.

CITIZENSHIP AND SUFFRAGE

Before the war Bingham was not considering an amendment, but
faced instead the pressing issue of congressional power over slavery in
the territories as raised by the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Dred Scott
case. He considered the Kansas-Nebraska Act unconstitutional as
violative of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which
prohibited deprivation of liberty without due process of law.19 The
Kansas-Nebraska Act instituted Stephen Douglas’s popular sovereignty
policy for establishing or forbidding slavery in the territories, which in
effect, as Bingham saw it, illegitimately put Congress’s authority
behind any local decision for slavery. Likewise, because of the Due
Process Clause, he disagreed strongly with the Dred Scott decision
denying Congress the power to prohibit slavery in the territories.20
Bingham’s most extended and “most significant speech of the
antebellum era” occurred in 1859 in the debate on Oregon
statehood.21 He opposed it for two reasons: first, the proposed Oregon
Constitution extended the right of suffrage for federal offices to aliens;
and second, it contained an exclusionary provision forbidding free
blacks from entering the state or using its legal apparatus. His
positions on these two issues are highly pertinent to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Akhil Amar highlights the importance of Bingham’s
contribution to the debate on Oregon when he avers that Bingham’s
“views . . . track almost perfectly the natural meaning of the words
Bingham drafted in 1866 as section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”22 Perhaps an overstatement, but the debate over alien
suffrage did prompt Bingham’s development of the distinction
between United States citizenship and state citizenship, a distinction
that finds a crucial place in the Amendment. Moreover, the debate
over Oregon’s exclusionary provisions supplied the occasion for his
development of his ellipsis theory of Article IV, Section 2 and his
identification of the content of the privileges and immunities of U.S.
citizenship, another central feature of the Amendment.

19 GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 44–45 (2013).
20 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 138 (1857); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1837 (1860).
21 MAGLIOCCA, supra note 19, at 62–65; CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–85
(1859), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 152, 152–56.
22 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 182
(1998).
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The U.S. Constitution provides that “the Electors” for members
of the House of Representatives, “shall have the Qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.”23 Oregon’s proposed state Constitution provided that
those qualified to vote in Oregon would include persons not born in
the United States, who have resided in the United States one year at
least, one half year at least in Oregon, and have “declared [an]
intention to become a citizen of the United States.”24 It would seem
that this provision satisfies the terms of Article I, Section 2 and is
therefore legitimate and constitutional.
Bingham disagreed.
Although the constitutional text expressly says no such thing, he
concluded that the States are not free to grant suffrage rights for
elections to federal office to individuals who are not U.S. citizens.
This was an unexpected and minority conclusion, as is clear from
the fact that there was strong and relatively settled precedent for
establishing this rule of suffrage in the state constitutions of Michigan
(1835), Wisconsin (1848), Indiana (1851), and Minnesota (1858), to
which Oregon was added in 1859.25 Although the vote on Oregon
admission was close in the House, 114 to 103, most of the opposition
came from Republicans on the black exclusion issue.26
Despite having few followers and apparently having the text
against him, Bingham had a serious constitutional case. The
Constitution in 1859 contained no explicit definition of U.S.
citizenship but it did provide that “the House of Representatives shall
be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of
the several States.”27 According to Bingham, “The people here
referred to are the same community, or body-politic, called, in the
[P]reamble . . . ‘the people of the United States.’”28 They are “the
citizens of the United States, and no other people whatever.”29 These
terms “people of the United States” and “‘people of the several States,’
as used in the Constitution of the United States, have invariably
received this judicial construction in all our courts, State and
23 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
24 OR. CONST. of 1857, art. II, § 2.
25 MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 1; IND. CONST. of
1851, art. II, § 2; MINN. CONST. of 1858, art. VII, § 1; Constitution of Oregon, OR. STATE
ARCHIVES, https://sos.oregon.gov/blue-book/Pages/state-constitution.aspx [https://
perma.cc/CCH3-AY3D].
26 Crafting the Oregon Constitution: After the Convention, OR. STATE ARCHIVES, https://
sos.oregon.gov/archives/exhibits/constitution/Pages/after-state.aspx [https://perma.cc
/7AD8-KT38].
27 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
28 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
29 Id.
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national.”30 In order to support this claim he even cites Chief Justice
Taney in the otherwise despised Dred Scott case.31
These “citizens of the United States,” otherwise known as “the
people of the several States” or “people of the United States,” are to
select members of the House and cannot be aliens because the
Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United States.”32 The
government of the Union can make citizens of the United States; the
government of the individual states cannot. Otherwise there would
not be “an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” Bingham’s interpretation
of “people of the several States” as equivalent to “people of the United
States” or “citizens of the United States” makes sense if we recognize
that he is taking the phrase “people of the several States” to mean the
people of the states taken together as a whole, equivalent to “the
people [i.e., citizens of] of the United States.” This entity is to be
contrasted to the people of each state taken separately. He must have
been struck by the language of Article I, Section 2, which could have
stated more simply, “the House of Representatives shall be composed
of members chosen . . . by the people of the states,” which Bingham
would take as referring to the citizens of the states. A difference
between the two formulations comes into view if we consider the
situation Chief Justice Taney posited in his Dred Scott decision.
According to Taney, not every citizen of a state is ipso facto a citizen of
the United States.33 The states retain a right never delegated to the
general government to make their own citizens, but the right to make
aliens into U.S. citizens belongs to Congress.34 The phrase “people of
the states” would imply that all state citizens or even residents were to
be among the pool of potential electors of the House of
Representatives. But the phrase “people of the several States”
designates only those state citizens who are also citizens of the United
States, for they possess the shared quality of either being natural born
citizens of their state and of the United States or naturalized under
congressional law. That is what makes them “people of the several
States” rather than just people of each state. They would be people or
citizens of other states were they to reside therein. Individuals who are
merely citizens of an individual state, that is, a foreign-born person
considered a citizen by his home state, but not naturalized by
congressional law, would not be a “citizen of the several States.” A
perhaps simpler way to trace Bingham’s thinking is to say that he takes
30
31
32
33
34

Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I).
Id.; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S 393 (1856).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406.
See id. at 405.
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the “people of the United States” of the Preamble to be obviously
referring to the whole population and therefore equivalent to “people
of the several States” by a simple substitution of “several States” for
“United States.” And in these interpretations he is backed up, or so
he claims, by steady judicial practice. Admittedly, this is not a selfevident reading of Article I, Section 2.
However, it is a plausible reading, and it makes the best sense of
the various provisions and Republican presumptions regarding natural
citizenship in the Constitution, that is to say, birthright citizenship in
the United States and the state of residence, and of the broader theory
of the Constitution that the two sets of governments in the federal
system have identifiably different constituent sovereignties.
One implication of Bingham’s interpretation is that the states are
limited to selecting among these citizens of the United States in their
setting of qualifications to vote for Congress. The states may omit some
members of that class, those beneath a certain age or of a certain sex,
or even by race, but they may not include any persons not of that class.35
III.

EXCLUSION AND ARTICLE IV, SECTION 2

Bingham took seriously Oregon’s unconstitutional effort to
endow aliens with the vote, but his argument regarding that seems
most centrally to have served to set the premise he used to make his
constitutional argument against the exclusion of black citizens. This
provision was “still more objectionable” than the alien suffrage provision.36 The Oregon Constitution mandated that “[n]o free negro, or
mulatto, not residing in this State at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution, shall come, reside, or be within this State, or hold any
real estate, or make any contracts, or maintain any suit therein.”37
Given Bingham’s theoretical grounding in the natural rights
philosophy of government, this provision struck him as a travesty. “I
say,” he said, “that a State which, in its fundamental law, denies to any
person, or to a large class of persons, a hearing in her courts of justice,
ought to be treated as an outlaw, unworthy of a place in the sisterhood
of the Republic.”38
Bingham straightforwardly denies “that any State may exclude a
law abiding citizen of the United States from coming within its
Territory . . . or acquiring . . . property therein, or from the enjoyment

35 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–85 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 152, 154.
36 Id.
37 OR. CONST. art. XVIII, § 4 (amended 2002).
38 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–85 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 152, 155.
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therein of the ‘privileges and immunities’ of a citizen of the United
States.”39 In support of this latter claim he cites Article IV, Section 2:
“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States.”40
Those persons who are to be excluded, however, are “citizens by
birth of the several States, and therefore are citizens of the United
States, and as such are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States.”41 That is to say, says Bingham, the
exclusion provisions are “an infraction of that wise and essential
provision of the national Constitution,”42 Article IV, Section 2. But is
that clearly so? As he is reading it, Article IV, Section 2 establishes a
right inhering in those natural born U.S. citizens to the privileges and
immunities of U.S. citizens, which include the right to enter Oregon
and to “a hearing in her courts of justice.”43 It must be noted that in
his restatements of the language of Article IV, Section 2 he regularly
expands the phrase in the article “all privileges and immunities of
citizens” by adding to it “of the United States.”44 He explains this
practice by referring to “an ellipsis in the language employed in the
Constitution.”45 He posits such an ellipsis because the clause’s
“meaning is self-evident that it is ‘the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States in the several States’ that it guaranties.”46
Generations of scholars have failed to find Bingham’s ellipsis reading
as self-evident as he claims it to be, but he infers from it a distinction
with grave consequences for his later crafting of the Amendment.
Article IV, Section 2 protects “[n]ot . . . the rights and immunities of
the several States; not . . . those constitutional rights and immunities
which result exclusively from State authority or State legislation;
but . . . ‘all privileges and immunities’ of citizens of the United States
in the several States.”47 I believe this can be well stated in terms of two
separate sets of privileges and immunities: those inhering in states and
those inhering in U.S. citizenship, only the latter of which are relevant
to Article IV, Section 2.
Two questions press against Bingham’s reading, however.
Granting that the claim to self-evidence is hyperbolic, how does he
come to import “of the United States” into the constitutional text and

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 154.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, cl. 1).
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154–55.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
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thus to limit the scope of Article IV, Section 2 to privileges and
immunities of U.S. citizenship? The second question is this: What are
the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship and how are they to
be distinguished from those of state citizenship?
His textual interpolation has, it seems, two bases in Bingham’s
mind. First, in restating Article IV, Section 2 he has the closing phrase
in all caps, “IN THE SEVERAL STATES,” so as to give it special
emphasis.48 That emphasis derives significance from his use in the
earlier part of his Oregon speech of the phrase “people of the several
States” as equivalent to “people of the United States” and of both as
equivalent to “citizens of the United States.” He is taking “citizens in
the several States” to refer to the people of the states taken together
and thus as citizens of the United States, as he had done earlier. Those
persons who are citizens in the several states would be the very same
persons who are “the people [or citizens] of the several States” in that,
except for residence, they would be citizens “in the several States.”
That reading might have seemed preferable to him, not only
because it resonated so well with his interpretation of the Article I,
Section 2 suffrage provision, but because of difficulties with the more
standard readings of Article IV, Section 2, according to which this
provision was taken to be a comity clause, that is, a clause aimed at
establishing comity among the states of the union.49 It was generally
taken to mean that citizens of one state, when present in another state
would be treated as citizens of that state would be and not excluded
from whatever fundamental special privileges and immunities the
state’s citizens, but not aliens, possessed.50
Bingham’s reading works a major transformation from that
standard interpretation of the clause. It now protects not the rights of
citizens of one state when visiting another state but a wholly different
class of rights—privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, whatever these might be.
The leading judicial interpretation of Article IV, Section 2 at the
time of the Oregon speech was the 1823 circuit court case Corfield v.
Coryell.51 It is a good vehicle for exposing the difficulties of the comity
reading of the Article IV, Section 2. Justice Bushrod Washington was
attempting to determine if New Jersey’s limitation on taking of oysters
to its own citizens was in violation of Article IV, Section 2.52 Read
literally as a comity provision, it would seem so, for citizens of other
states would appear to have the same right to oysters in New Jersey as
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 155 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2).
LASH, supra note 7, at 45–46.
Id. at 46–47.
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,320).
Id. at 551–52.
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New Jersey citizens. However, Justice Washington could not accept the
view that
under this provision of the constitution, the citizens of the several
states are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong
exclusively to the citizens of any other particular state, merely upon
the ground that they are enjoyed by those citizens; much less, that
in regulating the use of the common property of the citizens of such
state [e.g., rivers], the legislature is bound to extend to the citizens
of all the other states the same advantages as are secured to their
own citizens.53

Washington pronounced a much more limited coverage for the
clause: “those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature,
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens
of the several states which compose this Union.”54 This, of course, is
not what Article IV, Section 2 says, but it has a common sense ring to
it, echoed in Bingham’s exclusion from the clause of “rights and
immunities which result exclusively from State authority or State
legislation.”55 That is, the literal comity reading seems greatly
overinclusive, opening the system to, among other things, pervasive
moocher abuse.
Moreover, and even more clearly on Bingham’s mind, was a
privilege that Washington affirmed as covered: “the elective franchise,
as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in
which it is to be exercised.”56 On a strict comity reading, this would
seem to mean that the “elective franchise” should be available to out
of state citizens on the same terms, whatever they may be, as it is for
state citizens. Bingham, however, distinguishes political rights from
the sort of privileges and immunities covered in Article IV, Section 2.
His alternate ellipsis reading is meant to avoid these and related issues
that derive from the comity interpretation.
But affirming that Article IV, Section 2 covers the privileges and
immunities of U.S. citizenship leaves him with the question: What are
these privileges and immunities? How does one determine them? At
the least we may conclude that they are not the list of privileges and
immunities in Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion, for these are
identified as “privileges and immunities . . . which have, at all times,

53 Corfield, as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 92, 94.
54 Id.
55 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–85 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 152, 154.
56 Corfield, as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 92, 94.
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been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states [of the] Union.”57
These seem to be the very set of rights Bingham expressly excludes.
The core passage is this:
I maintain that the persons thus excluded from the state by this
section of the Oregon constitution, are . . . citizens of the United
States, and as such are entitled to all the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, amongst which are the rights of life
and liberty and property, and their due protection in the
enjoyment thereof by law.58

By closing its courts to free black citizens, Oregon is denying them this
legal protection in their rights of life, liberty, and property. These
rights are the rights identified in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Article IV supplies the link, then, to the Fifth
Amendment and the rights it protects.
Two points are especially noteworthy in Bingham’s appeal to the
Due Process Clause. First, he is clearly considering the Fifth Amendment to be among the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship to
which state citizens are entitled under Article IV, Section 2. The most
plausible explanation for that is that the Bill of Rights protections are
among the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens. That coheres
with what Bingham, and others, said of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause during the later debates over the
Amendment and with the text itself.59 Like Taney earlier and Justice
Miller later in the Slaughter-House Cases,60 Bingham clearly accepts
the thesis that there are two different sets of privileges and immunities
adhering to the two different kinds of citizenship Americans possess.
But how to identify the privileges and immunities of the two sorts of
citizenship? The most evident answer would be to look to the
constitutive documents and legislation of the relevant political entities,
in the case of privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship to the U.S.
Constitution. Rights affirmed or granted to citizens by virtue of the
U.S. Constitution are the citizenship rights of U.S. citizens. The Bill of
Rights is one such source of rights affirmations in the U.S.
Constitution, and Bingham is clearly taking these as rights of U.S.
citizens made applicable in a certain way to the states by Article IV,
Section 2.
Bingham often singles out for mention the Due Process Clause,
misleading some scholars to believe that it is somehow special and that
57 Id.
58 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–85 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 152, 155.
59 E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764–67 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 185, 185–91.
60 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 55 (1873).
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he does not mean to include the other rights protected by the Bill of
Rights or other relevant provisions of the Constitution as among the
privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens.61 But he clearly does
understand Bill of Rights protections as among those privileges and
immunities. In the course of his argument, he identifies other rights
to which U.S. citizens are entitled in the states by Article IV, Section 2:
the right of a fair trial, right of a jury trial, the right “to argue and to
utter, according to conscience.”62 These are rights sampled from the
Bill of Rights. Therefore, there is no reason to suppose that First
Amendment rights and, through the Fifth Amendment, natural rights
are the only ones included among the privileges and immunities of
United States citizenship. There are others besides Bill of Rights
provisions. Take the rights at stake in the then-recently decided Dred
Scott case: Did Scott have a right to bring suit against Sandford under
diversity jurisdiction?63 Taney said no free black could do so,64 but
Bingham would undoubtedly say yes. As citizens of the United States,
free blacks would qualify to bring suit in federal court if they satisfy the
diversity requirement. Indeed, the Constitution implies many rights
of that sort inhering in United States citizens by virtue of their U.S.
citizenship.
Article IV, Section 2 protects the rights of U.S. citizenship, which
includes the natural rights due to all persons via the Fifth Amendment.
Perhaps strangely, U.S. citizens are entitled to protection of their
natural rights, rights possessed by all persons, as Bingham emphasizes,
but persons who are not U.S. citizens are not entitled to these same
natural rights protections under Article IV, Section 2.
Scholars are indeed correct to see that the Due Process Clause is
somehow special but not in the way they believe it to be. The Due
Process Clause is the provision in the Bill of Rights that explicitly
mentions the natural rights of life, liberty, and property that Bingham
and most others at the time see to be the main business of government
to protect.65 He infers from the Amendment’s prohibition of
depriving persons of these rights an obligation, of a sort to be discussed
later, inhering in the states not only not to deprive persons of them
without due process of law but to provide protection for them as well.
Failure to protect them is a deprivation of them. When a state provides
protection for these rights it is not granting them; they already exist
for each and every person by nature and constitutional affirmation.
61 BARNETT & BERNICK, supra note 6, at 134.
62 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–85 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 152, 156.
63 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 402–03 (1856).
64 Id. at 406.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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So, in failing to protect, the state is depriving or countenancing the
deprivation of them. The combination of Article IV, Section 2 and the
Fifth Amendment is the vehicle whereby the Constitution is committed
to the central task of governance, according to Bingham, the security
of natural rights.
Article IV, Section 2, then, cast protection around two sorts of
rights: those which derive from the Constitution itself, such as the first
eight amendments, and natural rights incorporated via the Fifth
Amendment. This implies that there would be at least some overlap
with the rights listed in Corfield, for many of these are properly seen as
modes of effectuating protection for the natural rights of persons.
Recall that Bingham had excluded from Article IV, Section 2 coverage
“rights and immunities which result exclusively from State authority or
State legislation.”66 Any rights protected by states that are in service of
the natural rights are thus not exclusively derived from state authority,
but jointly from that authority, and the Fifth Amendment (and
nature). Bingham seems most concerned with the fact that Article IV,
Section 2 brings the Fifth Amendment and thus natural rights within
the ambit of the constitutional provisions applying to the states. That
is to say, his concerns with privileges and immunities are in the first
instance concerns with natural rights protections.
IV.

PREEXISTING (PERSONAL) RIGHTS, (STATE) OBLIGATIONS, AND
THE TASK OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Bingham’s antebellum constitutional pronouncements allow us to
understand his theory of preexisting personal rights. These rights are,
it must be emphasized, rights against the states. They derive from
Article IV, Section 2 and include rights derived both from the
Constitution, such as the personal rights secured in the Bill of Rights,
and natural rights as carried into Article IV, Section 2 by the Fifth
Amendment. This is admittedly not in all ways orthodox constitutional
law, but it echoes many of the themes of antislavery constitutionalism.67
But what of the other part of Bingham’s theory, that the states
never had any right to abridge or deny these preexisting rights, but
that they regularly “have assumed . . . [that] power, and that without
remedy?”68 The lack of a right in the states to abridge or deny these
rights can be restated as a preexisting obligation, for, as he says, “No

66 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–85 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(emphasis added), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 12, at 152, 154.
67 See generally JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1861–1865 (2013).
68 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2530–45 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 170, 178.
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State ever had the right . . . to deny to any freeman the equal
protection of the laws.”69 That is, the states were obliged not only to
refrain from denying or abridging but also to actually supply equal
protection of the laws, which, we have already seen, meant for
Bingham equal protection of natural rights. We may thus collect the
states’ lack of power to deny and positive duty to supply protection to
rights under the rubric of obligation—an obligation “to secure these
Rights,” as the Declaration of Independence puts it.70 Bingham’s
thinking here closely matches the natural rights/social contract
general theory according to which governments acquire upon their
formation an obligation to provide rights protections and not themselves to threaten rights. This theory was developed with a unitary
system of government in mind, but under American federalism there
were two sets of governments, which complicated matters substantially.
Which government, state or federal, was responsible for protecting
which rights? Were both sets of governments responsible for securing
natural rights? Constitutional rights? Bingham’s answer was that with
the Fifth Amendment and Article IV, Section 2 both sets of
government had some sort of obligation to both sets of rights. But
these obligations were asymmetric and ineffectual, as he indicates
when he pronounces violation of these obligations to be “without
remedy.”71 He means there is in place no legal or constitutional means
to prevent or remediate these violations. Although he speaks most
often of congressional powers of prevention and remediation, he also
means no judicial remedy either.
The issue of enforcement implicates Bingham’s complex and
elusive theory of obligation. He conceives of three levels or types of
obligation relevant to the Fifth Amendment rights of primary concern
to him. First, there is a natural law obligation; second, a moralconstitutional obligation; and third, a full scale constitutionally
enforceable legal obligation.
The rights identified in the Fifth Amendment are natural rights.
As such, entirely independently of any constitutional text, they impose
natural law obligations upon all human beings, including state officers
and by extension their states, not to deprive rights holders of the
objects of their rights unless authorized by the natural law. This is a
moral obligation but has no standing in positive law. There certainly
is no constitutional right or obligation involved. It is not a very precise
obligation even in the moral sense. The obligation of a state entity
toward a nonmember not within the jurisdiction of the state is a
69 Id.
70 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
71 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2530–45 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 170, 178.
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truncated obligation, an obligation toward only one-half of the due
process pair of obligations. The state has an obligation toward
nonmembers not to deprive them of their rights by, for example,
fighting unjust wars against them, but it does not have an obligation to
provide legal protection for their rights. This obligation derives from
the social contract and not entirely from nature. So the first level of
obligation is merely moral and partial relative to what Bingham’s Fifth
Amendment provides.
The natural rights along with the other rights were, however,
incorporated in a constitutional provision that is directly binding on
the federal government but not on the states. Article IV, Section 2
brings these rights within the ambit of the states. These rights are
among the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens and state officials
take an oath to support the Constitution as in Article VI.72 That oath
brings with it what I am calling a moral-constitutional obligation not to
deprive U.S. citizens of their national citizen rights. It is a moral
obligation deriving from the Constitution but there exists no means of
constitutional enforcement. Neither courts nor Congress have any
enforcement powers. Such enforcement as there is vis-à-vis the states
depends solely on the good faith of the oath takers. It was evident to
Bingham that good-faith enforcement was not successful.
The status of both the natural rights and the other national rights
of U.S. citizens was quite different relative to the federal government.
It and its officers were under a full-scale obligation to protect and
respect those rights. These obligations were imposed by oath but more
directly by express constitutional command and more effectively by
genuine enforcement mechanisms. There is, then, a basic asymmetry
in the system of rights and obligations in American federalism. U.S.
citizens possess rights, both natural and positive, that are fully
protected and enforced against the federal government but, even
though truly constitutional rights, these are left merely to the tender
consciences of the states. It should be added that the federal
government has a very truncated obligation to supply protection of the
laws—not in general but at most only in areas of the enumerated
powers.
My account of Bingham’s three-tiered system of obligation may
leave the reader puzzled about Bingham’s aims in attacking the black
exclusion provisions of the proposed Oregon Constitution. According
to his own theory of obligation, Congress had no power to enforce the
moral duty Oregon had to recognize these natural and, via Article IV,
Section 2, constitutional rights. But here he was, apparently
attempting to enforce these duties on Oregon. The explanation for
72

U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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this action by Bingham is that he was not actually attempting to
congressionally enforce the rights and duties at stake here but was
seeking congressional disapproval of the Oregon Constitution under
Congress’s power to admit new states and as part of that to pass on the
adequacy of the new state’s proposed constitution. Oregon’s
Constitution on its face violated the spirit of the U.S. Constitution and
rejected outright the moral-constitutional duties imposed on it by
Article IV, Section 2.
Bingham’s antebellum Constitution affirmed many rights that
had no legal remedy, an anomalous situation for a legal system. With
slavery, the cause of that incompleteness, destroyed, Bingham sought
to complete though not to revolutionize the Constitution. That was
the aim of the Amendment he wrote. As he frequently said during his
advocacy for the Amendment, he meant not to add new rights but to
render enforceable the rights and duties imperfectly present already
in the Constitution.73 And that is exactly what he did in the two major
drafts of the Amendment he prepared. The Amendment was to
protect the natural rights of persons both through the Privileges and
Immunities Clause’s inclusion of the Fifth Amendment’s natural rights
within it, and the more direct protection of those rights through the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Amendment
contained what might seem redundant protection for natural rights.
Part of that redundancy, so far as it existed, was for emphasis because
of the capital importance of natural rights in Bingham’s conception of
the proper business of government. But technically there was no
redundancy because of the odd gap the Privileges and Immunities
Clause contained. It will be recalled that that Clause protected the
natural rights limits identified in the Fifth Amendment for citizens of
the United States even though those rights belonged not merely to
citizens but to all persons. His Amendment’s Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses fill that gap for they are addressed to all persons.
These two Clauses also provide a fuller explication of Bingham’s
reading according to which the Due Process Clause’s prohibition of a
deprivation of rights is taken to include a positive duty to supply
protection to those rights. States are to protect the rights to life,
liberty, and property by not depriving persons of them except by due
process of law. We might call that a negative obligation. But states are
also under a positive obligation to supply legal protection to those
rights. In one version of the Amendment the text provided for “full
protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property,”74 rather than
73 Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham
and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 380 (2011).
74 J. JOINT COMM. 56–58 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham), as reprinted in LASH,
Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 66, 67.
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“equal protection.” Bingham generally preferred the modifier
“equal” to “full.” One reason, no doubt, is that “full protection” does
not supply an operational standard by which to judge its fulfillment. It
is always possible to provide more protection than any given level of
protection. So “full protection” would be unworkable as an actual
standard of enforceability.75
A more important reason for Bingham’s preference for “equal” is
his aim to complete but not revolutionize the Constitution. Contrary
to the fears of many during the debates on the Amendment, Bingham
did not intend to have the federal government replace the states in
providing day-to-day protection for rights. He greatly valued the
federal system and its division of authority between the two levels of
American government.76 But he also did not think the states should
be free to violate rights of persons and of U.S. citizens. He sought what
is best called a corrective federalism. The federal government is to
have power—both judicial and legislative—to correct the states when
they stray but not to replace them with some sort of plenary power over
rights. The “equal protection” standard was well suited to this
conception of constitutional corrective federalism, for it set a standard
by which states’ errancy could be easily identified and corrected: the
state is to supply to all persons’ rights protection equivalent to the
rights protection it provides to the most favored element in the society.
The commitment to corrective federalism also accounts for
another crucial feature of the Amendment: originally Bingham
provided that
[t]he Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property.77

(It should be noted how this draft amendment echoed almost exactly
Bingham’s antebellum thinking about privileges and immunities and
the various citizenships. Note especially his deliberate usage of
“citizens of each State” and “citizens in the several States.”) This
version of the Amendment met with two somewhat opposite
objections. For one, it would authorize action by Congress to
effectuate its end. This congressional action was to remedy the
absence of constitutional enforcement mechanisms for the moral-

75 But see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 81–86 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Bingham), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 620, 628.
76 Id. at 626–27.
77 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033–35 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 99, 99.
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constitutional rights of the original Constitution. The response,
however, was that it would be better to put the requirement of equal
protection directly into the Constitution by way of prohibiting the
states from denying it in order to guard against congressional inaction
or perverse congressional action. On the other side, there was a fear
that the text would allow Congress to take on too much—not
correcting the states, but replacing them, not completing but
revolutionizing the Constitution. In the face of these criticisms
Bingham redrafted the text of the Amendment into the “no State
shall” form with which it entered the Constitution.78 This change was
relatively easy for him to make for he did not ever wish to see Congress
exercising the kind of power some feared the earlier version would
make possible.79 The change in form was less radical than it might
seem, however, for the congressional empowerment was maintained as
Section IV of the Amendment, and as Bingham understood it was not
limited to correcting state action but also state inaction in failing to
supply equal protection.80
In the Amendment’s final form, the Due Process and the Equal
Protection Clauses are to supply protection of basic natural rights
against state violations of the same. A good example of what Bingham
had in mind for such protection was the Civil Rights Act of 1866.81
Although it has sometimes been wrongly said that Bingham drafted his
amendment in order to incorporate and legitimate the Civil Rights
Act, this was highly unlikely because Bingham introduced his draft
amendment before the Civil Rights Act was introduced and the two
documents contain entirely different language.82
Nonetheless,
Bingham saw the Civil Rights Act as the kind of corrective legislation
Congress would be empowered to pass once the Fourteenth
Amendment was accepted into the Constitution. The chief operative
part of the Act was this:
[C]itizens, of every race and color . . . shall have the same right in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce

78 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 81–86 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Bingham), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 620, 625; Michael P. Zuckert,
Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment—The Original Understanding of Section
Five, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 123, 134–44 (1986).
79 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1083, 1087–95 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Hotchkiss), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 108, 117–118.
80 See generally Zuckert, supra note 78.
81 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note
1, at 605, 605–06.
82 Id.; see also Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship
Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 GEO. L. J. 1389, 1393
(2018); Michael P. Zuckert, Completing the Constitution: The Fourteenth Amendment and
Constitutional Rights, 22 PUBLIUS 69, 78 (1992).
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contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as enjoyed by white citizens 83

and “shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties . . . and none
other.”84 That is to say, these are “positive laws that secure natural
rights” of life, liberty, and the acquisition and maintenance of
property.85
When the Civil Rights Act was first introduced Bingham opposed
it, largely because he believed Congress lacked the power to protect
these rights without a new empowerment such as his amendment was
to supply.86 But he did not object to the list of rights in the bill.87 When
the Civil Rights Act was repassed after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment he voted for it.88 The law provides protection for rights
of person and property by setting a standard that states must meet in
their legislation and execution of law, and that standard is equality
between whites and blacks. Other sections of the law put teeth into it
by setting penalties for state officials who fail to abide by the terms of
the Act.89
The other main clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, providing
that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” completes
the set of new rights protections provided by the Amendment.90 As we
have seen from Bingham’s earliest constitutional arguments, this
clause covers all those rights that accrue to citizens of the United States
as citizens of the United States and not as citizens of the states. These
include, as Bingham often said, the rights affirmed in the Bill of Rights,
and all other rights expressly affirmed, such as the habeas corpus right,
or implied by the text and structure of the Constitution, such as the
right to sue in federal court.91

83 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 38 (1873) (Field J., dissenting) (quoting Civil Rights
Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 630, 641.
84 Force Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (including repassage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 605, 606.
85 BARNETT & BERNICK, supra note 6, at 49 (quoting Eric Claeys’s analysis of William
Blackstone).
86 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1290–96 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham),
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at 135, 135.
87 Id.
88 See Lash, supra note 82, at 1454–57.
89 Force Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 1, at
605, 606.
90 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
91 Much ink and scholarly energy have been expended trying to interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment, an expenditure to which I have just contributed. There is,
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment was not the last
amendment, it is special in that it completes the logical structure of
the incomplete original Constitution by providing a completed
symmetrical system of rights protections for both natural and positive
constitutional rights in relation to both national and state
governments. In this sense it perfects the Constitution.

however, a more straightforward way to understand Bingham’s handiwork: to read his text
as a text should be read. This approach has played a remarkably small role in the various
attempts to parse the Amendment. By reading the text properly I mean reading it not as a
series of nuggets—phrases and clauses with largely independent meanings—but reading it
structurally, that is, taking note of the way the text proceeds by way of five sets of contrasting
concepts, which set off and clarify each other. I have presented such a reading in a
collection of essays edited by Alan Levine, Thomas Merrill, and James Stoner. Michael P.
Zuckert, Completing the Constitution, in THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE CIVIL WAR 293,
308–315 (Alan Levine, Thomas W. Merrill & James R. Stoner, Jr. eds., 2018); see also Zuckert,
supra note 82 (providing a related analysis).
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